This essay is an effort to show how Henri Bergson's distinction between two dramatically different sorts of memory led, after a lapse of three quarters of a century, to the reintroduction of his distinction into mainstream psychology and, strikingly, into successful studies in memory structure and brain localization. Other of his ideas connected with this initial distinction have also come into play in psychology recently, among them theories of cue-dependent forgetting (Tulving 1977), selectionism (MacNamara 1996), and analysis-through-synthesis accounts of perception (Holland 1978, Neisser 1967, Halle and Stevens 1962). These notions might be interesting to pursue. The emphasis in this essay, however, will be on Bergson's notions of memory in their relations to memory science.

This paper proposes that the hard problem of consciousness is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the "mage" is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia - the "redness" of the cube is regarded as the problem, not the cube as a form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must re-examine the classic spatial metaphysics of space and time, initiated by Galilei, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysics, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, and a problem of even greater primacy is the memory that supports the transforming events of perception. This article argues that memory is a necessary condition for qualia. The storage of "snapshots" of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysics engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, is a quality requiring this memory. Since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The proposed solution is based on Bergson's temporal metaphysics wherein motion is undivided, and the global motion of the universal field itself carries an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, Bergson provided a unique solution - one that leaves the problem of representation behind - as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world.

The holomovement plays a central role in David Bohm's philosophy of the implicate order. The aim of the present paper is to show that the notion of Hamiltonian flows, which emerges from many-particle Hamiltonian mechanics, fits well the notion of the holomovement, in the same sense that individual instruments meld into a symphony. This analogyis made possible by using modern concepts of symplectic topology. Since Hamiltonian mechanics, which is a reformulation of the second law of Newtonian mechanics, has fewer interpretational problems than quantum mechanics, the explicate order associated with the classical world is much more obvious than that of the quantum world with its complementary views. The classical world lives in a symplectic space, while the quantum world unfolds in the covering space.

This paper, together with a planned companion treating contemporary decoherence-based approaches, reviews and analyses the approaches to locality and to mind-body dualism proposed in Everett interpretations of quantum mechanics. Here we treat the explicitly mentalistic many-minds interpretation proposed by David Albert and Barry Loewer (1988). In particular, we investigate what kind of supervenience of the mind on the body is implied by Albert and Loewer's many-minds interpretation, and how the interpretation of the related "mindless hulks" problem affects the issue of locality within this interpretation.