The perennial nature of some of philosophy's deepest problems is a puzzle. Here, one problem, the realism-anti-realism debate, and one type of explanation for its longevity, are examined. It is argued that realism and anti-realism form a dialetheic pair: While they are in fact each other's logical opposite, nevertheless, both are true (and both false). First, several reasons why one might think such a thing are presented. These reasons are merely the beginning, however. In the following sections, the dialetheic conclusion is directly argued for by showing how realism and anti-realism satisfy Priest's "inclosure schema". In the last section and the conclusion, the conscious mind's role in creating realism and anti-realism is discussed. This role further supports the conclusion that realism and anti-realism form a dialetheic pair.

Freedom for Contradiction is the English translation of a book by Hermann Levin Goldschmidt, in which he developed a philosophy of dialog first outlined in his Philosophy as Dialogic in 1948. In a nutshell, dialogic suggests to deal with the tension of contradicting points of view without trying to resolve them in something like a synthesis, as dialectics has it. The physicist Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founding fathers of quantum theory, saw a close relationship of dialogic with the concept of complementarity that Bohr introduced into physics. This resulted in a brief correspondence between Pauli and Goldschmidt in February and March 1949. Here we translate their interesting exchange into English, together with some background.

A model of dynamic brain function based on the work of Walter Freeman offers a more satisfactory account of free will than alternative accounts that attempt to con.rm or reject it. Freeman has shown us that mammalian brains function between open-ended information gathering and cycles of practiced response to form a rhythm which engages us with the world. This kind of response cannot be explained in agent-causal or mechanistic terms. These models offer a stark choice between action as independent of external causes, or as a product of physical parts and processes internal to an organism. A neurodynamic model conceives of the will as a continuous action-producing neurocognitive process shaped by the organism's interaction with its surroundings and its imagined and self-originating continuation of a set of rhythms in responding to them. These rhythms confront us with the fragility of our own exis- tence and adaptation, which cannot be unpacked like an industrial system or digitalized like a computer program. The uidity of our interaction with the world and the fragility of our being are more adequately dealt with by continental thinkers than recent analytic philosophy. Both are naturalistic, but the former are more open to human creativity and a sense of freedom to which we can aspire.

I show that if mental states are a function of physical states, then they are nonlocal, in a sense that will be explained. I argue that, if mental states are reducible to brain physics, and if they are integrated experiences, this nonlocality implies that classical physics is not enough, in particular the computationalist thesis does not hold. I illustrate the argument with a thought experiment. The proof of nonlocality is straightforward and general, but the result is counterintuitive, so I spend a large part of the article discussing possible objections, alternatives, and implications. I discuss the possibility that quantum physics allows this kind of nonlocality.

Brown and Ladyman (2019) have provided an interesting criterion of refutability of physicalism. The criterion is based on the prediction that physics won't hypothesize the existence of psychological entities. This is an important suggestion because if viable, the criterion could purge physicalism from the charge of being a vacuous doctrine (Crane and Mellor 1990). In this paper, I argue that the criterion of refutability is not viable. I demonstrate that different interpretations of the criterion will prove it either vacuous or incompatible with naturalism.